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INFORMAL PROOF, FORMAL PROOF, FORMALISM
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Abstract. Increases in the use of automated theorem-provers have renewed focus on the rela-
tionship between the informal proofs normally found in mathematical research and fully formalised
derivations. Whereas some claim that any correct proof will be underwritten by a fully formal proof,
sceptics demur. In this paper I look at the relevance of these issues for formalism, construed as an
anti-platonistic metaphysical doctrine. I argue that there are strong reasons to doubt that all proofs
are fully formalisable, if formal proofs are required to be finitary, but that, on a proper view of the
way in which formal proofs idealise actual practice, this restriction is unjustified and formalism is
not threatened.
§1. Introduction. Recent developments in automated theorem-proving have led some
to conjecture that in future all proofs submitted to professional mathematics journals will
have to be ‘verified’; for example will have to be in a form which can be machine-translated
into a formal proof which can be validated by an automated theorem checker. Thus Freek
Wiedijk thinks that improvements in automation will lead to
a quantum leap, and suddenly all mathematicians will start using for-
malization for their proofs. When the part of refereeing a mathematical
article that consists of checking its correctness takes more time than
formalizing the contents of the paper would take, referees will insist
on getting a formalized version before they want to look at a paper.
(Wiedijk, 2008, p. 1414)
whilst Fields medallist Tim Gowers writes:
My own view ... is that ... over the next hundred years or so, computers
will gradually be able to do more and more of what mathematicians do
... and eventually supplanting us entirely. (Gowers, 2002, p. 134)
Such claims look reasonable if what has been called the ‘standard view of proof’ is
correct:
every mathematical proof should be convertible into a formal derivation
in a suitable formal system. (Marfori, 2010, p. 261)1
However, on the other side of the fence, Yehuda Rav, in an important and influential
paper ‘Why Do We Prove Theorems’ Rav (1999), casts doubt on the standard view.
We have what seem like polar opposite views then. One pictures informal proofs as akin
to promissory notes, valid only to the extent that they are, or at least can be, backed up
by ‘fully formal’ proofs. At the other extreme it is held that informal proofs cannot, in
general, be converted or cashed out in formal terms. As well as its relevance to the issues
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arising from the emergence of automated theorem-proving, this discussion has, of course,
especial salience for formalists in the philosophy of mathematics, who seem committed to
the ‘standard view’.
In fact there are (at least) two different debates going on here, one over epistemological
issues, the other metaphysical. The epistemological debate is a descendant of debates
which arose out of the nineteenth century movement for increased rigour in mathematics.
This led some, following Frege (but not necessarily with his logicist goals in mind), to set
as an ideal in mathematical practice that proofs consist in chains of reasoning with no links
missing, no gaps to be filled in by intuitive leaps. What the emergence of formal systems
quickly showed, however, was that the huge increase in the length of proofs once they
are formalised tends to increase, not decrease, the probability of error, especially when
proofs are written out and checked by humans.2 But the emergence of automated proof
systems raises the possibility that this problem can be overcome. There is now, therefore,
a live epistemological standpoint, which I will call ‘enformalism’, and which holds that
the goal of having all proofs produced by professional research mathematicians encoded
in formal proofs and validated by an automated theorem-checker is both realistic and
desirable.
On the other hand, many proponents of doctrines called ‘formalism’ in the philosophy of
mathematics are primarily motivated by metaphysical considerations, specifically a desire
to avoid commitment to a platonistic ontology and believe that this can be effected either
by replacing the notion of truth, as applied to mathematical sentences, by that of proof,
or by closely identifying truth with formal proof. I will use ‘formalism’ to characterise
metaphysical doctrines of this type. It is formalism the metaphysical doctrine with which
I am concerned. The two positions are logically independent. Even if formalism is false,
it could be that every mathematical conjecture we ever are likely to consider will in fact
be formally provable or refutable in ‘real time’ so that automated verification is feasible.
And likewise formalism could be true but enformalism false. We cannot conclude from
the fact that a sentence has a formal proof that mathematicians, even using the most
powerful computers which are technologically possible, will be able to find and check the
proof. Nonetheless there are some looser connections. In particular, the arguments which
sceptics about enformalism employ do seem to cast doubt on formalism. My aim in this
paper is to defend (metaphysical) formalism by arguing for an account of the relation
between informal and formal proof which leaves formalism intact even if scepticism about
enformalism is justified.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next two sections, I will try to clarify
further the informal versus formal proof distinction and tie down a little more carefully
which of the many philosophies of mathematics sailing under the flag ‘formalism’ are
in the line of fire, if the sceptical line adopted by Rav is correct. In Section 4 I look in
more detail at one of Rav’s main targets, what he calls ‘Hilbert’s Thesis’ and in Sec-
tion 5 give what I hope is a strong version of the argument against it. I then consider
a counter-argument, one which proceeds indirectly: Section 6 raises an apparently even
more devastating problem for formalistic approaches namely the fact that formal proof far
outruns concretely realisable proof. Strict finitism, I argue, is not a coherent response to
this problem. Instead I set out, in Section 7, a conception of idealisation which I claim an
2 Moreover the process of formalising an informal proof is not, at least at present, a mechanical
one and the possibility of an incorrect formalisation leading to a false validation of a supposed
theorem cannot be ruled out (cf. Rav, 1999, p. 35).
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anti-platonist formalist can legitimately appeal to and which resolves the problems posed
by the paucity of concrete proofs. The apparent tangent into strict finitism is necessary for
the argument because, I argue in Section 8, the notion of idealisation which liberates the
anti-platonist from strict finitism also liberates us from the prejudice that formal proofs
must be finitary. I conclude that Hilbert’s Thesis, in its finitistic version, is false, and with
it the standard view of proof, so that some doubt is cast on enformalist optimism. However
by amending the standard view to allow infinitary derivations we arrive at a plausible view
of the relation between informal and formal proof. The position, I argue, is eminently
compatible with an uncompromisingly anti-platonist formalism.
§2. Hilbert’s Thesis is Rav’s term for the proposition that:
every conceptual proof can be converted into a formal derivation in a
suitable formal system (Rav, 1999, p. 11)
By ‘formal system’ Rav means a purely syntactic set of rules distinguishing those strings
or trees of formulae which are ‘derivations’ from those which are not. It is clear that he
also intends that the usual constraints be placed on syntactic systems: wffs and proofs are
to be finite, theoremhood recursively enumerable. A ‘conceptual proof’ by contrast has
‘irreducible semantic content’ (ibid).
Rav is sceptical about the thesis (p. 12 fn. 3, p. 31) declaring it an ‘article of faith’ (p. 35)
rather than something for which plausible grounds have been given. Defenders of the faith
still exist, it would seem– ‘the still persistent belief in Hilbert’s Thesis’, (p.28)– but, despite
the persistence, ‘the number of believers in it is constantly dwindling’ (p. 35).
Perhaps so but as we have seen, many take Hilbert’s Thesis to encapsulate ‘the standard
view of proof’ and take recent developments in automated theorem checking and proving
to provide support for the standard view. If Hilbert’s thesis is false then something is amiss
with the standard view. Moreover the falsity of Hilbert’s thesis would seem to entail the
falsity of the philosophical doctrine of formalism, a doctrine which still has its adherents
today.
Not that formalism is itself a sharply defined thesis: in philosophy as elsewhere, ‘ism’
terms tend to have a variety of meanings. In order to sharpen focus, I will exclude cer-
tain readings such as the view that mathematical utterances are meaningless and also the
doctrine that mathematical propositions lack truth values; though ‘formalism’ has been
used to encompass these extreme doctrines, they will not be considered here. More posi-
tively, historical ‘formalists’ have generally tied mathematical correctness (or truth, if they
admitted the notion) to formal provability. Equating, with Rav, ‘formal provability’ with
‘derivability’ let us stipulate that a philosophy of mathematics only counts as formalist for
present purposes if it rules out the possibility of underivable mathematical truths (and takes
mathematical utterances as, in general, having truth values). Finally, in order not to take
on too much, let us concentrate on what one might call ‘uniform’ theories of mathematical
language, theories which give the same metaphysical treatment to all parts of mathematics,
thus leaving aside Hilbert’s own, rather instrumentalistic, formalism, with its completely
different treatment of finitary versus infinitary mathematics.
Thus sharpened, formalism seems to entail Hilbert’s Thesis (though not conversely).
Supposing our system of ‘conceptual proofs’ is sound, it will generate only mathematical
truths; but if formalism is right each such truth is formally derivable. So if Rav’s scepticism
is about the thesis justified, formalism, as well as enformalism, is in trouble.
It might be said this is of little interest: is formalism in any recognisable sense not
philosophically dead? No, there have been signs of revival. Rav himself in a later article
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Rav (2007) criticises the views of Jody Azzouni who describes himself as holding to a
‘version of formalism’ (Azzouni, 2004, p. 105) in which ordinary mathematical proofs
‘indicate’ formal derivations. To be sure it is not entirely clear that Azzouni is a formalist
in the sense under discussion. The indication relation is left rather open: Azzouni does not
claim that the indicated derivations all belong to a single formal system; rather ordinary
proofs can indicate derivations from a ‘family’ of formal derivations. Clearly a given
body of ordinary proofs cannot indicate both proofs in a formal system with A1, ... An
as theorems and also proofs in a system with ¬A1, ... ¬An as theorems (cf. Rav, 2007,
p. 303, fn. 18). So we need to know more about the indication relation and what makes
one system, but not a different, inconsistent one, the one which is indicated by a given
informal practice. Furthermore Azzouni holds that the indicated derivations need not exist;
certainly concrete tokens of them need not exist in the same period as the informal proofs
which indicate them. Proofs in ancient Greek geometry indicate 21st century or later
derivations. In fact, as he acknowledges, they need not ever exist, they may be too long ever
to be written down (Azzouni, 2006, p. 154). And yet it is these non-existent proofs which
are supposed to explain the consensus among mathematicians about which informal proofs
are correct! Azzouni himself seems later to have doubts about the plausibility of all this:
I kept falling (against my will) into a view that mathematicians had to
be engaged in something like sophisticated syntactic pattern-recognition
while perusing informal mathematical proofs, so that they would be
sensitive (without realizing it) to a background of nonexistent formal
derivations. (Azzouni, 2009, p. 25)
moving to an ‘inference package’ view of mathematical reasoning. Thus it is no longer
clear that he remains a formalist.
Even if Azzouni is no longer a formalist, and perhaps never was, there are other con-
tenders for contemporary defenders of formalist positions, for example among the fiction-
alists. Of course the fictionalist, at least of the most straightforward sort, does not hold that
mathematical theorems express truths, a fortiori not truths linked in some tight sense with
provability. For according to such a fictionalist all existential mathematical theorems are
false, the only mathematical truths are trivial truths, for example universal generalisations
of the form ∀x(φx → ψx), φx expressing a mathematical property hence, according to the
fictionalist, true of nothing.
However this can mislead. The fictionalist does have a distinction between correct and
incorrect mathematical sentences, utterances and assertions. ‘There are infinitely many
primes’ is a correct mathematical claim, ‘there are infinitely many complex solutions to
each quadratic equation’ an incorrect claim. Fictionalists tempted by deflationary views of
truth will presumably be tempted to hold that it is true that there are infinitely many primes,
even though they must reject the idea that what makes it true is the existence of an infinitude
of abstract objects. What does make it true? That it is part of the ‘story of mathematics’
as ‘Oliver Twist was born in London’ is, in some sense, part of Dickens’s story (Field,
1989, pp. 203)? If the implication is that to be true is to be proclaimed, with or without
proof, a theorem in the mathematical literature and never have any challenge to that claim
accepted by the mathematical community then we should reject this version of fictionalism.
There will be no end of mathematical claims, some true, some false, which never make it
into the mathematical literature at all, never being considered by actual mathematicians.
And given the number of “theorems” whose purported proofs were later discovered to
be faulty, we can be fairly sure some falsehoods will remain accepted for all time as
“theorems”.
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If, however, the fictionalist declares that what makes a mathematical sentence correct/true
is the existence (or possible existence) of a proof, then this counts as a version of formal-
ism.3 The fictionalist, however, now incurs the burden of proof, as it were, borne by all
formalists: to tell us what proofs are, to tell us whether they are concrete tokens or abstract
objects, to tell us what it is about the meaning of mathematical statements that enables
non-synonymous statements about the existence of proofs and disproofs to provide their
truth-conditions and to respond to the many objections raised against formalism.
Further contemporary formalists perhaps include Gabbay (2010), though Gabbay writes
‘Contrary to traditional (game) formalism, my proposal shall not involve an attempt to
provide formal derivations of each and every arithmetic truth’ (p. 221). Weir (2010) is
explicitly formalist in identifying what makes a mathematical truth true with the existence
(perhaps unknown) of a proof with, that is, its provability.
So formalism as a philosophy of mathematics is not dead. Moreover, turning from the
metaphysical aspect to the epistemological, if Marfori and the others cited in footnote 1
are right then the standard view of informal proof links such proofs to formal derivations
as required by Hilbert’s thesis and thus renders enformalism plausible. There is evidence
for their claim in the increasing numbers taking seriously the computerised formalisation
effected by programs such as Coq, Isabelle and Mizar, in the trend among some category
theorists, such as those attracted to the univalent foundations program, towards a practice
of informal proof which can be readily computerized (Awodey, 2010, p. 3) and in explicit
statements such as the remarks by Wiedijk and Gowers cited at the beginning of this paper.4
In sum, Hilbert’s thesis is of interest in that a compelling argument against it seems to
yield in turn a compelling argument against a live metaphysical position in philosophy of
mathematics and also a serious challenge to a view of the relation between informal proof
and formal derivation which has significant support from mathematicians. Has Rav, then,
presented a compelling critique of Hilbert’s Thesis?
§3. Firstly, let us look at Rav’s distinction between conceptual proof and formal
derivation, between
a conceptual proof of customary mathematical discourse, having an irre-
ducible semantic content,
which is to be distinguished from a
derivation, which is a syntactic object of some formal system. (Rav,
1999, p. 11.)
Derivations he defines fairly standardly:
a (linear) derivation in a formalised theory T is a finite sequence of
formulas in the language of T, each member of which is either a logical
axiom, or an axiom of T, or is the result of applying one of the finitely
many explicitly stated rules of inference to previous formulas in the
sequence. With some minor modification one similarly defines a tree
derivation. ibid (see also Rav, 2007, p. 301.)
3 An alternative, suggested to me by Mary Leng, is to take correctness to be determined not by
formal provability from axioms but by ‘logically following’ from axioms, where the notion of
logical consequence is defined in terms of a primitive notion of modality. This retains some
distance between formalism and fictionalism.
4 See http://www.mizar.org/project for Mizar.
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But Rav goes further than merely distinguishing semantics from syntax, saying:
Once we have crossed the Hilbert Bridge into the land of meaningless
symbols, we find ourselves on the shuffleboard of symbol manipulations,
... these symbols do not encode meanings ... it is the very purpose of
formalisation to squeeze out the sap of meanings in order not to blur
focusing only on the logico-structural properties of proofs. Meanings
are now shifted to the metalanguage, as is well known. (op. cit. p. 12.)
As the axioms in a formalised theory are strings of symbols, syntactic
objects, the issue of their truth is vacuous (op. cit. pp. 18–19.)
Rav here seems to be subscribing to the view that because symbols are not meanings
therefore they cannot have meanings, or cannot be assigned them. But this is wrong-
headed, as Quine says:
There is a short-sighted but stubborn notion that a mere string of marks
on paper cannot be true, false, doubted or believed. Of course it can,
because of conventions linking it to speech habits and because of neural
mechanisms linking speech habits causally to mental activity. (Quine,
1995, p. 94.)
Bearing that caveat in mind, I will stick to Rav’s informal proof versus formal proof/
derivation distinction generalising the latter notion slightly to:
A derivation in a system S is a member of the intersection of every set
containing a base set of one-step proofs– axioms– and closed under the
formal rules for generating larger proofs out of smaller which charac-
terise S.
This is the usual idea of defining formal systems by induction. What is crucial is how
we understand ‘formal rule’. The usual gloss is along the lines of: ‘a rule which appeals
to nothing outside the system’. This is vague but greater precision is unlikely to be had
in respect of a concept as fundamental as this (the concept of ‘formal rule’ not itself
being part of formalised mathematics). We can help clarify by looking to applications
of the idea. Thus in grammar we assume we start from atomic symbols whose internal
structure, if any, is utterly irrelevant and characterise those sequences which are complex
well-formed expressions without appeal to relations the sequences may have with any
entities outside the strings of symbols. And similarly, taking certain formulae as our base
elements and dubbing these ‘axioms’, complex proofs are specified as structures, strings,
trees or whatever of wffs, without bringing in relations to anything else. In diagrammatic
derivations we must similarly have formal rules making no appeal to anything outside the
diagrams which determines how to build more complex diagrammatic derivations out of
simpler.
In the simple case where derivations are linear strings of wffs, each later string follows
precisely from the earlier ones by one of the rules, with a similar determination of the
output of proof-constructing rules in more complex architectures; a derivation is a gapless
proof, in other words. An important point to note is that there can be derivations in natural
languages such as English, even more obviously when they are augmented with a little
mathematical notation. Note that I did not require that the formal rules of a derivation be
what we would recognise as logical rules. Quite obviously, when learning the school rules
for addition and multiplication, we are not given axioms from which we can derive, using
the machinery of Principia Mathematica perhaps, 7+5=12. But we are given formal rules
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in the above sense, just as we are when taught one or other of the various algorithms for
long addition or multiplication (so a long multiplication set out in canonical form consti-
tutes a derivation). Similarly, I would guess that the overwhelming majority of students
being taught calculus are not exposed to axioms but rather taught rules, e.g. basic rules for
differentiation, power rules, product rules, quotient rules, the chain rule and so on. These
are completely formal rules.5
These sort of examples show that derivations abound. There are concrete tokens of
mathematical derivations all over the place, in textbooks, exam scripts, worked examples
in engineers’ rough notes, in the hardware of computers computing values for various
functions and so on. The derivations in textbooks and notebooks often take the form of a
linear string of formulae each derived from earlier ones by one of the rules of the system
or by applications of identity laws such as Leibniz’ law. There are also partial derivations,
derivations with gaps; these are derivation sketches in a definite and concrete sense. They
could, if we could be bothered, be expanded to full derivations. By this we do not mean
that if we kept going without let up or error for a few billion years or more a full derivation
would result. Rather they could be completed in a very ordinary every day sense of could:
with a few hours more of patient writing out, we could produce a gapless proof.6 Indeed
Rav’s ‘fully rigorous’ proof (2007, p. 305) that there is a unique left and right identity in
a group is easily expanded to a derivation of that form without having to dress it up in a
Hilbert-style axiomatisation.
Rav, to be sure, might quibble about whether derivations, as construed above, are formal
proofs, for he seems to have in mind a model of proof in which all the non-logical action,
as it were, is loaded into the axioms. But, at least when our background logic has the
requisite structural rules, the choice of whether to use rules, or axiomatic versions of rules,
is essentially a matter of convenience or aesthetics. Thus to take some simple cases, any
system S with an axiom scheme φ is equivalent to one without the axiom scheme but
with the schematic rule (supposing a sequent architecture) T  φ, T a truth constant.
Conversely a relatively simple sequent rule of the schematic form,7
from P1, ...Pn  Q conclude
R1, ...Rm  S
can be dropped in favour of the axiom scheme
[(P1 → (P2 → . . . (Pn → Q) . . .)] → [(R1 → (R2 → . . . (Rm → S) . . .)]
given → I (conditional proof), → E (modus ponens) and sufficient structural rules.
But whether the mathematical reasoning we take to be non-logical is to be formalised
axiomatically or in rule form is not the key point for sceptics about formalisation. Rather
it is whether it can be formalised at all, whether axiomatically or in rule form.
5 As a referee points out, one might well call these sorts of examples calculations rather than
derivations. Even if there is this intuitive distinction between those categories, the important
point is they are both sub-species of a more general category, that of a formal system, as
characterised above. For convenience I will continue to use ‘derivation’ for the more general
category.
6 Or, more and more commonly nowadays as noted at the outset, we might write the sketch up in a
form which we can input to an automated theorem-prover which might then give us fairly quickly,
and in some cases in readily human-readable form, the full derivation.
7 omitting the constants which will occur in the schematic letters in any non-trivial rule;
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§4. For none of the previous points about ‘really existing’ derivations directly touch
on Rav’s main case, namely that the proofs which professional mathematicians are in-
terested in, the sort of things which appear in mathematics journals (at least in advance
of the promised era of machine-generated formalisations), are not derivations, nor
partial derivations; indeed they are not, in general, remotely like derivations (or ‘calcu-
lations’, if you prefer) such as a simple chain of equations in calculus. How then does
Hilbert’s thesis link the informal proofs of the professional mathematician with derivations
of the humdrum type discussed at the end of the last section? I suggest the following
expanded version of the thesis as a way of making sense of the possibility of such links:
Hilbert’s Thesis II: In any cogent mathematical practice there is a sys-
tematic process of transformation (not necessarily known to the prac-
titioners) which turns any correct proof into a (suitably related) finite
derivation in a formal system S. The system S in question is determined
by the informal practice and its transformation process; in particular,
the formal rules of S are rules which are implicit in the mathematical
practice.
Note that it is entirely open what the concrete tokens of formal systems are, whether
sounds, ink marks, electronic states of computer systems, biological compounds or what-
ever. The notion of formal system also applies, as the observations of the previous section
made clear, both to natural and formal languages. Not only that, there is no restriction
solely to linguistic systems– diagrammatic reasoning can be formal as well. This is clear
in systems such as Peirce’s diagrammatic proof-architecture, where there are precise rules
for what counts as a legitimate proof-step. The status of other diagrammatic modes, ancient
Euclidean demonstrations or modern category-theoretic diagrams for example, is more
problematic. They perhaps stand to Peirce-style pictorial derivations as informal proof does
to linguistic derivations.
But though there is this openness to a wide range of formal systems, for Hilbert’s
Thesis II (HTII) to have definite content we must still require that it be a determinate matter
what formal system underlies a given area of mathematics in the sense that provability8 in
that system is at least a necessary condition for the correctness of the suitably transformed
informal proof. Does that mean that any formal system can validate the correctness of
a given body of informal practice? No, we will at least require that the system be non-
trivial. Are there any further constraints? For a radical pluralist about logic, perhaps not;
however those who believe there are some semantic constraints on soundness of logical
rules will require that correct informal proofs transform into derivations in which the rules
for the logical operators are sound. At the other extreme from the radical pluralist, a logicist
will hold that informal proofs will be transformed into derivations in which all axioms and
inferences are logical, governing formal correlates of operators deemed to be logical.
Clearly HTII still leaves a lot up in the air about the relationship between informal proof
and derivations. We need to fill in more detail about what it is for the formal system to
be ‘suitably related to’ and ‘determined’ by informal mathematical practice, work which
would require more extensive investigation than can be given here. But as an example
of one way one might proceed, take inferentialist accounts of the meaning of logical
and mathematical operators. If these accounts are right, then there will be syntactic rules
which capture the actual reasoning practice of competent mathematicians. A formalisation
8 which I will equate, throughout, with ‘existence of a proof, known or unknown’;
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of these rules, then, will count as a suitably related system determined by the informal
practice. However, even if inferentialism is true, enformalism will not directly follow. For
our inferential practice, like our linguistic practices in general, may not be completely
transparent to us. If it is sufficiently opaque then the enformalist goal of having all infor-
mal proofs encoded in formal, machine-validated proofs may not be practically feasible.
Nonetheless the inferentialist picture in tandem with HTII makes enformalism at least
plausible; the combination is also music to the ears of the metaphysical formalist, though
of course the problem of the ontological status of the formal derivations remains to be
resolved.
As it happens, I do not myself belief inferentialism is correct. The link between meaning
and linguistic practice, including inferential practice, is more complex than inferentialism
allows. But the stronger the case for holding that there is some determinate (at least for the
most part) connection between a subject’s grasp of logical and mathematical operators
and her tacitly following formal rules involving those operators, the stronger the case
for enformalism and formalism. Of course even if this is so, the epistemology of the
relationship between informal and formal proof will remain complex. To illustrate, even
if inferentialism is correct and I have a full grasp of logic and mathematics, and even if
there is a formal proof of C from P1 to Pnusing rules I implicitly accept, it does not in
the least follow that any old informal chain of reasoning I produce which takes us from
the premisses Pi to C is a good proof. Similarly, even if there is a proof of Goldbach’s
Conjecture from the axioms of PA, simply affirming the axioms and then uttering ‘hence
every even number is the sum of two primes’ does not constitute a good proof, indeed any
sort of proof.
What then is the connection between informal proof and formal proofs, if HTII is cor-
rect? Can we set this out in a way which explains why good proofs increase our mathemat-
ical knowledge and understanding? These are very difficult questions in the epistemology
of mathematics. Although we can rule out trivial cases– one-step proofs consisting of no
more than appending an unobvious consequence to axioms and so forth– providing a more
substantive answer is a major challenge. It seems too restrictive, for example, to require
that a correct informal proof have, at some interesting level of abstraction from detail, the
same overall structure as a formal derivation which, on this picture, validates it as correct.
We should, though, contra Azzouni, insist that the moves used in the formal derivation
should be moves featuring in the practice of the informal provers, or at least moves they
would recognise and acknowledge.
However these tricky and important questions are not the topic of this paper, bearing,
as they do, primarily on the epistemology, not the metaphysics, of proof and truth in
mathematics. But whatever view one takes on what makes an informal proof of a truth
P of a given mathematical discipline a good proof, if HTII is correct then the formalist
can give an answer to the question what makes P a truth, namely the existence of a formal
derivation of the proposition expressed by P using axioms and rules implicit in the informal
practice of exponents of that discipline.
§5. But is HTII correct? One class of objections Rav raises to his original formulation
of Hilbert’s thesis concerns the absence of formal axioms for large chunks of mathematics
(and, one could just as well add, the absence of formal, non-logical, inference rules too).
No axioms have ever been proposed for even a fragment of matrix theory.
It is a typical unaxiomatised theory. What is then the logical status of its
extensive results? (Rav, 1999, p. 16)
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Rav also mentions graph theory, measure theory and number theory (as opposed to axioma-
tised Peano arithmetic) as unaxiomatised theories. This may pose a problem for enformal-
ism.9 But the point is not fatal to formalistic approaches so long as it is plausible that there
is, implicit in mathematical practice, rules (and perhaps axioms never implicitly brought to
the surface) which, when formalised, generate derivations of every truth of matrix theory,
measure theory etc. Even if there is some fuzziness as to which formal system is implicit,
even if it is not completely determinate whether it is system S, or S′ or S′′, this can still
be accommodated if pretty much everything we hold to be a determinate truth of the
theory is provable in each of the reasonable ‘precisifications’ of informal practice with
no determinate falsehoods provable in all.
A much more interesting argument of Rav’s, with respect to formalism as a metaphysical
picture, goes as follows. Suppose we are trying to understand an informal proof of B from
A and we break it down into a linear sequence of claims:
A → A1, A1 → A2, ..., An → B
(the arrow representing merely an informal path from antecedent to consequent). Baffled
initially by the move from A to A1 we eventually see how the author must take it to go and
explain it to a student by interpolating A′ yielding A → A′ → A1.
But the process of interpolations for a given claim has no theoretical
upper bound. In other words, how far has one to analyse a claim of the
form ‘from property A, B follows’ before assenting to it depends on the
agent. There is no theoretical reason to warrant the belief that one ought
to arrive at an atomic claim C → D which does not allow or necessitate
any further justifying steps between C and D. This is one of the reasons
for considering proofs as infinitary objects. (Rav, 1999, pp. 14–15, italics
in the original).
For present purposes, Rav’s suggestion that proofs are infinitary objects is of most
interest. It should be noted, though, that his motivation is not in the metaphysical issues
which the formalist addresses but much more in the epistemology of proof. Putting it
crudely and oversimplifying, he argues that proofs matter more in mathematics, even with
regard to generating knowledge and understanding, than the theorems proved. Informal
proofs yield new concepts, methods and techniques.10 Moreover comprehension of proofs,
he emphasis, is agent-relative, dependent on background knowledge.
Why, though, should that lead to the conclusion that proofs are infinitary objects? If, for
example, HTII was true, and if, contrary to the sceptical suggestion above, the formal in-
ferential rules implicit in our practice are not opaque to us then we would have a theoretical
reason to suppose that by transforming an informal proof sufficiently far we would arrive
at ‘atomic’ moves which every competent agent, regardless of background, would see as
warranted outright and in need of no further justification. But Rav’s argument suggests
9 Though it is not hard to imagine formalising matrix theory by taking a formalisation of complex
analysis and adding some axioms and rules to govern manipulation of matrices conceived of as
ordered sets of complex numbers.
10 Methods for doing what, one might ask? Generating new proofs and so further concepts, methods
and techniques without end? It is hard not to feel that at least one intrinsic goal of mathematical
methods and techniques is settling the truth of interesting mathematical theses by establishing
them as theorems.
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a metaphysically interesting reason why one might contrapose here, and conclude to the
falsity of HTII.
For Rav throughout assumes that derivations must be finite; in fact he takes for granted
the usual view on which the theorems form a recursively enumerable set. Call such systems,
‘Gödelian systems’. Granted this, we can put the objection to HTII in the following way.
We know from Gödel’s limitative results (augmented by Rosser) that many important
mathematical theories, when formalised as Gödelian systems, are negation-incomplete:
any consistent extension of the arithmetic theory Q for example. But we also know (it is
generally held) that any Gödel sentence G: ∀x¬(BewT (x, G) is true, where ‘BewT ’
represents provability from a true (in the standard model) extension T of Q, T being the
formalisation determined by the transformation process of HTII as the one underlying,
let us suppose, our arithmetical practice at a given time. ‘Provability’ here is a recursive
notion; that is, x proves y is a recursive relation over codes of sentences and derivations,
thus ∃x(x proves y) is a recursively enumerable relation. But then given that T is true
(hence consistent), no informal proof of T’s Gödel sentence can be transformed into a
formal derivation, subject to the Gödelian constraints, since there is no such derivation
(in a formalisation of theory T). And since we have insisted that there has to be a defi-
nite formal system fixed by every mathematical practice (at least where we assume each
sentence has a determinate truth value), the fact that the Gödel sentence for the theory T
which formalises current practice is formally derivable in an extended system T ∪ {G} is
irrelevant since G is not an axiom of T or any reasonable idealisation of our arithmetical
practice. Moreover given the tight tie in formalism (most simply outright identification) of
truth with provability in an underlying formal system S, the truth of G seems to refute that
philosophy of mathematics.
But informal proof, the argument here seems to go, is different. Rav seems to be think-
ing of appeal to consequence relations, such as full second-order consequence, which go
beyond finitary, first-order r.e. provability:
the implicit underlying logic of mainstream group theory is second-order
logic. (op. cit. p. 17)
The argument against HTII can then be presented in the following way. If we interpret
‘derivation’ to mean derivation in a system in which the theorems are recursively enumer-
able, then in many interesting mathematical theories there will be statements11 such that
neither they nor their negations are derivable, in the appropriate formalisation. Yet in many
cases, we will firmly believe we know that one or other of the statement or its negation is
true, not through some mystical intuition but because we feel we have an (informal) proof
of it. Hence informal proof 	= formal derivation.
§6. We have here, then, a sharp version of the dilemma for the standard view of
informal proof and of course for formalists, a dilemma generated by Gödelian results. If
truth = formal provability then undecidable sentences must lack a truth value. It follows
that many 1 sentences of arithmetic lack truth value, including some we think we know
are true on the basis of informal proofs of them. Even if most ‘ordinary’ mathematical
theorems escape this fate, even if Mizar, Coq and co. can validate these with a formal
derivation, this is still a most implausible result and leaves a potential infinity of intuitively
11 including ‘natural’ statements of interest to mathematicians in general, such as have been
investigated by H. Friedman, J. Paris, L. Harrington, L. Kirkby and others.
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determinate mathematical theses, some perhaps informally provable, lacking in truth values
and formal derivations or refutations.
Nonetheless though I think this argument does spell deep trouble for HTII, it does not
dispose of formalism (though it may dispose of the ‘standard view of proof’). In order to
explain why, I need to look at an even more basic problem for formalism, at least for those
formalists (surely the majority) who are motivated by suspicion of abstract objects.
For a standard objection to formalism is that the analysis of the truth of mathemati-
cal statements as consisting in, or somehow grounded in, the provability of strings does
nothing to support a metaphysical view of a world devoid of abstract objects because the
strings which are proven, and the proofs which prove them, are themselves abstract objects.
The only way to get round this problem, the argument continues, is to identify syntactic
objects with concreta, with mereological fusions of concrete tokens or some such. But
since there are surely only finitely many of those, (at least if they are to be graspable in an
unproblematic sense by us) we are plunged into a uncompromising strict finitism, and for
most12 this constitutes a reductio ad absurdum of formalism.
What really causes the difficulty here is the fact that the shortest derivations of mathe-
matical theorems are often orders of magnitude larger than the theorems themselves. If that
were not so, a really determined formalist/strict finitist could coherently hold that there are
only finitely many mathematical sentences, all shorter than some upper bound in size, but
each provable or refutable, challenging the non-finitist to come up with an instance of a
mathematical truth outside the bounds. If the bounds are set high enough, the non-finitist
will not be able to provide a concrete refutation of the strict finitist thesis.
But we know from Gödelian speed-up considerations that for many a provable sentence,
the shortest derivations of it or its negation are vastly longer than the sentence itself. For
example, for any polynomial f, given a system Sn+1 of n+1th-order arithmetic, there will
be theorems of the system which are expressible in the language of nth order arithmetic
and whose shortest proofs (including the theorem itself, as last line) in Sn+1 are l long but
whose shortest proofs in nth order arithmetic Sn are f (l) long. If Sk is the highest order
system we ever use, there will be Sk truths, expressed in short, graspable sentences, whose
proofs contain more steps than the estimated number of neutrinos in the universe, truths
for which there can be no concrete proof in other words. Quite simple examples of this sort




+ 1) is prime
(Tennant, 1997, p. 152) which may well be such that no concrete proof or refutation exists,
even though the problem is a simple one in 0 arithmetic.
It is clear that the formalist has to appeal to idealisation of our concrete practice. One
approach to idealisation is via what one might call ‘supernaturalised epistemology’, that
is appeal to ideal beings who can do what is only, in the obscure and problematic phrase,
“in principle possible” for us. I have argued that appeal to such beings is inadmissible for
a naturalist and that this route is a dead end (Weir, 2010, pp. 181–191). A better strategy
emerges when we reflect on one key reason why idealisation is essential even for those
sympathetic to the strict finitists’ concretist predilections, namely the all-pervasiveness of
abbreviation. Although concrete tokens of proofs and derivations are not only finite but
12 Though not all: the mathematician Doron Zeilberger defends a strong finitist position he calls
‘ultra-finitism’; Edward Nelson also expressed strong finitist leanings.
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quite small (at least if they are to be digestible by humans), this does not mean there is a
small upper bound on the size (as abstract strings or trees) of wffs or proofs for which
a concrete token can exist. If I am writing out derivations for a fragment of arithmetic in
a language LT which has only successor and zero signs ‘S’ and ‘0’ I might tire of writing
out numerals SSSSSSSSS0 etc. in full and introduce metatheoretic abbreviations such as
S101000 0 to stand for the numeral consisting of ‘0’ prefaced by 101000 occurrences of ‘S’.
There is no upper limit to what might be ‘reached’ by abbreviation here, given the open-
endedness of notational innovation.
Let F′ be an abbreviational system for F if a) F′ conservatively extends F by the addition
of rules which permit uniform substitution of occurrences of P′ for string P (of the same
grammatical category) occurring in formulae in proofs in F and b) P′ is shorter (as a string)
than the corresponding P.13 Of course here we speak with the platonist. The formalist is
therefore under an obligation to show how such assertions in proof theory can be true
without ontological commitment to abstract objects. If this can be done, however, she is
entitled to point out that many theorems for which there are no concrete derivations in
unabbreviated systems have concrete derivations in extended abbreviatory systems.
Note that an ‘abbreviatory’ concrete token such as:
S10
1000
is as much a token of an abstract string as this one: SSSS0. We can think of it as a
stretching of the equiformity relation among tokens. Letters in different fonts can look
rather different; and this written token– ‘ten’– is a very different physical entity from the
vocal utterance of that word. Similarly ‘SSSS0’ and S40’ look a bit different but we can
treat them as tokens of the same type. What abbreviation enables us to do is produce tokens
which are equiform with no concrete unabbreviated token, none we can grasp anyway.
Abbreviation applies not only to expressions and wffs but also to derivations. This is
a token:
∅ (1) ∀x∀y(Sx = Sy → x = y) Axiom












































)−30 4,5 → E
... ... ... ... As [5-6] for 2 × (101000–3)
1 (2 × 101000) S0 = 0
1 ([2 × 101000]+1) ∃x(Sx = 0) (2 × 101000), ∃I
∅ ([2 × 101000]+2) ¬∃x(Sx = 0) Axiom
1 ([2 × 101000]+3) ⊥ ([2 × 101000]+1), ... +2, ¬E
∅ ([2 × 101000]+4) S1010000 	= S
(
101000
)−10 ([2 × 101000]+3), ¬I
of a (2 × 101000)+4 long derivation. At any rate, if we add tokens of an explanation of
‘As [5-6] for 2 × (101000–3)’ steps to the token proof we have complete instructions
which enable us to figure out (working in metamathematical proof theory) exactly what
13 See, for example, the extended Frege systems of Cook & Reckhow (1979, sec. 4).
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the abstract derivation is. This is not a derivation sketch. It is not to be compared to a proof
by cases in which one writes out, say, two of the eight cases and leaves the other six as
exercises. Here we have an explicit recipe for fixing on the right abstract object, just as
much as in a token proof of absurdity from say SSS0 = SS0 in which we write out every
step without abbreviation.
True, one could not grasp the above token proof without grasp of decimal notation and
exponentiation yet the underlying formal system itself is just arithmetic in a language LT
with 0, S as constants. We can imagine someone being trained to understand LT and carry
out unabbreviated derivations in that language yet not grasping decimal notation nor having
exponentiation defined for them. So surely the above token derivation is not a token of an
LT -proof?
Certainly there is a difference between abbreviated and unabbreviated derivations and
someone may grasp an unabbreviated derivation but not the abbreviated one. The same can
be said of informal proofs vis à vis formal. This does not alter the fact that, for someone
who does grasp the abbreviated derivation, the token derivation may be as compelling as
an unabbreviated one. In fact, one utility of abbreviated derivations lies in the fact they will
often be much more compelling than unabbreviated derivations, where, that is, the latter
actually exist; the other key advantage, then, is that they enable some theorems to be con-
cretely derived which could not otherwise be. Nor does the above observation, concerning
what we might call the conceptual surplus of some types of abbreviation, alter the fact that
the token in the extension of T (provided it is conservative) demonstrates (though not, of
course, with absolute, Cartesian-sceptic proof certainty) a fact about provability in LT , not
provability in some other system, e.g. of decimal arithmetic.
We have here an insuperable problem for strict finitism. Abbreviation means that in the
corpus of our mathematical utterances, derivations and proofs, many wff and proof tokens
are ‘stranded’ high up in a hierarchy of complexity. It is not possible– not feasible for the
real flesh and blood humans who engage in the practice and understand its results– to con-
struct and grasp tokens of all the wffs and derivations of lower complexity. We can see this
with S1010000. No matter what notational innovations we come up with, we will never at any
time have a system in which tokens, abbreviated or unabbreviated, of all the numerals for
numbers < 101000 are instantiated. This means that lots of concretely realised expressions
will be such that some (in many cases most) of their constituents will not be concretely
realised. Similarly lots of concrete derivations, such as the one above, will be “missing”
many or most of their sub-proofs, namely those which are not concretely realised.
This does not prevent the strict finitist from giving a physicalistic specification of con-
crete surrogates for wff and proof (cf. Goodman & Quine, 1947; Weir, 2010, chap. 6).
But it means that the specification cannot be given in the usual inductive fashion, as the
intersection of all inductive sets containing the base set and closed under the complexity-
forming operations. And this in turn means we cannot prove even very simple facts about
wffs and proofs– about unique readability, expressive adequacy and so on; nor define,
by recursion for example, even fairly simple concepts such as the degree of complexity
of a formula. Inductive proof and recursive definition are simply unavailable to the strict
finitist; the chain from simplest atoms to formulae and derivations of arbitrary complexity
is broken. But a philosophy of mathematics which requires us to give up inductive proof
and recursive definition is absurd.
§7. Thus the realities of actual mathematical practice ‘do in’ strict finitism. But far
from posing an insuperable problem for formalism, the above considerations show how to
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defuse the argument against formalism from HTII. With regard to the latter, remember that
the formalism I am considering here does not maintain that mathematical practice is ‘mere
symbol-shuffling’; it holds rather that mathematical utterances (including metamathemati-
cal utterances) generally express truth-valued assertions. The formalism need not come in
the specification of the sense or literal content of mathematical sentences but in explaining
what makes them true or false. To help make things clear I will utilise the SMALL CAPS
convention (Horgan, 1994, p. 316), ‘THERE ARE MOUNTAINS’ is used to assert the mind-
independent existence of mountains, ‘There are numbers’ to make an existential claim
whose truth is determined not by the world being the way it is represented to be, if we
read the literal content in the same way as in the mountain claim. Rather, it is determined
by the existence of a derivation of (a translation) of ‘there are numbers’. Of course a good
deal of the hard work required to defend this variety of formalism lies in making sense
of this distinction between literal content, which in general has nothing to do with proofs
or derivations, and the derivations which make-true or make-false, and I am not going to
attempt that large task here.14 But if we grant for now the possibility that such a position
can be made out, can it escape the fatal defects of strict finitism?
Yes: just as the formalist believes that THERE ARE NO NUMBERS, but also believes
there are infinitely many prime numbers, so too the formalist believes that THERE ARE NO
ABSTRACT SYNTACTIC TYPES, but also that there are infinitely many wff types and proof
types, inductively generated from base sets in the usual way. Granted that formalism can
make sense of mathematical utterances in general as truth-valued assertions, the formalist
can define meta-mathematical concepts applicable to formal systems in the usual way, for
example the formal concepts of provability and of truth (for a narrower object language).
Alternatively the concepts may not be explicitly defined but introduced via a formal theory,
for example an axiomatic theory of truth which can be used to explain how the truth and
satisfaction conditions of complex expressions depend on those of simpler ones.
This means that, by contrast with the strict finitist, the formalist can, without bad faith,
actually state the problem raised in the previous section, namely the existence of a whole
class of sentences of decidable fragments of mathematical languages which are true but
whose formal proofs are too long to be concretely realised. But the tools which the formal-
ist possesses and which enable her to state the problem enable her to solve it: the formalist
claim is that for every mathematical truth there is a derivation of that truth (not that
THERE IS A CONCRETE PROOF); for every mathematical falsehood there is a refutation.
And in mathematical logic textbooks THERE ARE CONCRETE DERIVATIONS, or at least
proof sketches, of those metamathematical 2 “lower-case” facts (for every truth, there
is a proof . . . ) linking formal truth and formal derivation for such sub-languages as 0
arithmetic.
Is this too good to be true, too easy a victory for the formalist? Well, what would it be for
the formalist position to be false? Formalists, of course, are no more immune from mathe-
matical error than anyone else. If the formalist affirms a sentence S (of formal system F) but
in fact THERE IS A CONCRETE DERIVATION (IN F) OF ¬S, then the formalist has made a
mathematical error.15 But the considerations of the previous section, the argument against
strict finitism in particular, show us that affirming S though THERE IS NO CONCRETE
STRUCTURE WHICH, SUITABLY INTERPRETED, CONSTITUTES A DERIVATION (IN F)
14 This is attempted in Weir (2010, pp. 25–38)
15 If F is inconsistent there is simply no truth or falsity to be had in the system, at least if provability
distributes over the connectives of the formal system just as truth does.
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OF S, does not mean that the formalist has spoken falsely, even by formalist lights.
For there may BE16 A CONCRETE FORMAL PROOF that there is an abstract derivation
of S. Even if one does not wish to call this a derivation-in-F it plays a similar epistemic
role as a concrete derivation in F. The case is similar to, though a little more complex
than, an abbreviated derivation of S in a conservative extension of F. We might call the
F*-derivation of there is a derivation-in-F of S  an indirect derivation-in-F. An indirect
derivation-in-F of S counts as making S true (as a sentence in system F, or one whose truth
is determined by system F) just as much as a derivation in F would. So the concrete truth-
maker, if one wishes to use this language, of a sentence S of system F can take, on this
view, one of two forms: a derivation-in-F of S, or an F*-derivation of the proof-theoretic
claim that there is an F-derivation (for suitable F*).
If, however our formalist affirms S (hence S is true but also affirms that THERE IS NO
CONCRETE STRUCTURE WHICH CAN PLAY THE ROLE OF A DERIVATION IN F* THAT
THERE IS AN ABSTRACT F-PROOF OF S, for any suitable F*17 then, indeed, the formalist
would be guilty of inconsistency. But formalism is not an inconsistent position, for the
formalist need not, should not, make any such affirmation.
But what about the concretely undecidable claims which the formalist takes to be deter-
minate, for example the primality claim P above? Neither the appeal to indirect derivation
nor the ubiquitousness of abbreviation resolves the problem of concrete indeterminables.
No matter what abbreviatory conventions we introduce and however much we appeal
to indirect derivations, there will always be concrete utterances which we can neither
prove– whether directly or in abbreviated form– nor disprove. (The point of the appeal
to abbreviation is to rule out strict finitism as an anti-platonist response to the problems
formalism faces not to attempt to provide concrete derivations, direct or indirect, for every
mathematical truth.)
Once we see, however, that the formalist is as entitled to affirm the truth of metamath-
ematical results as results in arithmetic or set theory, we also see that she can consistently
and legitimately affirm True(P) ∨ True(¬P), where P is our concrete indeterminable.
Given transparency of truth, which is unproblematic in these non-paradoxical contexts, the
formalist must then as a consequence affirm P ∨ ¬P and so will be convicted of error if
THERE IS NO CONCRETE PROOF of P ∨ ¬P or at least no proof that there is an abstract
proof of this instance of LEM. But even if the background logic is non-classical (as I think
it should be) simply including all instances of LEM as axioms of the formalised arithmetic
theory will ensure that there are very short concrete proofs backing up all these assertions
of instances of LEM. Hence no inconsistency.
The sceptic will counter-reply that the inconsistency lies in the combination of a plau-
sible account of the meaning of the connectives together with the formalist views on
the truth/derivation connection, that is in an incoherent combination of claims about the
recursive structure of truth and its inter-relations with the recursive structure of formal
proof. If disjunction and negation, at least in mathematical contexts, are truth-functional
16 As always in mathematics, the copula here is timeless; moreover there is no requirement that the
EXISTENCE of the concrete structure ever be known. But it has to be a structure which we flesh
and blood humans could, had we known of it, (in a perfectly ordinary sense of ‘could’) interpret
(by suitably interpreting its elements and the structural inter-relations) as a derivation in a formal
system we use. By using only a relatively non-theoretical, quotidian notion of ‘could’ there is no
naturalistically suspect importation of modality here of the sort to be found, some claim, in modal
structuralism.
17
‘Suitable F*’ raises some issues I will look at in the next section.
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operators then since P ∨ ¬P is true either P is or its negation is (P our concrete undecidable
as above). Since “truth is determined by concrete provability”, the formalist is guilty of
incoherence in affirming, as she must, that THERE IS NO CONCRETE PROOF of P (nor a
concrete proof there is an abstract derivation of P) nor a concrete proof of its negation (nor
that there is an abstract refutation).
The mistake in this argument lies in the scare-quoted “truth is determined by concrete
provability”. As we have seen, there are no interesting systematic claims about the syn-
tax or semantics of the concrete corpus of our mathematical utterances. Generalisations
about the syntactic and semantic structure of the formal idealisation of our concrete output
can only be made from within a similarly formal metatheory. The formalist, in such a
theory, makes the claim that the formal idealisation of truth coincides with the formal
idealisation of provability. But this claim can be backed up by a concrete proof in the
metatheory of arithmetic that 0 is decidable and that true = provable = the existence
(not: ‘EXISTENCE’) of a proof.18 At no point need the formalist affirm something which
she has reason to believe will lack a concrete proof. The objection to formalism fails.
The upshot, then, is that formal idealisation of informal proof is treated as similar in
some important respects to idealisation in empirical science. For example, just as one
can view a continuous distribution of real values representing mass density in a fluid as
the image of an injection of physical properties and relations into a structure which may
be richer– perhaps fluids are large but finite assemblages of elementary particles each of
uniform mass density– so too the injection of the finite body of our actual mathematical
utterances into formal systems idealises by injecting a finite structure into a smoother, more
manageable, infinite one. The statement that this injection exists is made true, as with all
other mathematical statements, pure and applied, not, even in part, by the EXISTENCE OF
ABSTRACT OBJECTS but by its provability. (Of course large questions are raised for the
formalist here, both about the purposes of idealisation in mathematics– how similar is it to
idealisation in empirical science?– and also about whether the formalist is entitled to the
view that there can be truths of applied mathematics, pace Frege, 1903. See Weir, 2010,
chap. 5.)
However there is a further problem which the formalist faces which an absolutist platon-
ist does not. The formalist criterion for asserting or assenting to a mathematical sentence S
which is being uttered as part of a practice whose optimal formalisation is F should be, if
the considerations above are correct:
THERE IS A CONCRETE STRUCTURE which can play the role of a deriva-
tion in F of S or a derivation in F* that there is an abstract F-proof of S,
for any suitable F*
where F* need not be F.19 But if there are no constraints on F*, if it can be a trivially
inconsistent theory for example, then everything is correctly assertible. We can prove ‘The
string 0=1 is provable from the axioms of PA’ from a trivial F*. We thus need to impose
the condition that any such F* be consistent. But that is not sufficient. If the literal content
of sentences provable from F* is to tell us something about abstract proofs in F, we must be
18 Or at least backed up by a concrete sketch that there exists such a formal proof in an extension of
the language of arithmetic in which notions of truth and proof are introduced.
19 And where, when S is a disjunction, there is no implication that THERE IS A CONCRETE
DERIVATION, in F or F*, of either disjunct, even where formal provability distributes over the
connectives, even where the theory is prime in other words.
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able at the least to define in F*, formal-proof-in-F (or at any rate axiomatically characterise
it) in a way which captures our intuitions about proof-in-F. If F* cannot do this, or if it
proves too many counterintuitive results about F-provability then we will view the literal
content of strings in the F*-system as telling us not about formal proof in F, but some other,
if perhaps related, notion– schproof in F or whatever. (Likewise, as noted, a string ‘0 = 3’
in a formal system of arithmetic modulo 320 does not express the same proposition as that
string in standard arithmetic, it expresses a truth of modular arithmetic not arithmetic.) The
strong formalist, then, will not be committed to the assertibility of palpable absurdities in
arithmetic, analysis or whatever. Will all indeterminacy be eliminated though? Can we rule
out the possibility of two different systems F* and F** which are optimal candidates for
formal theories of proof-in-F but which disagree on the provability of some non-obvious
conjecture P? The answer is no, as we will see when I utilise the response to strict finitism
given above to address the worries from Rav we started from, the concern in particular that
formalising proof is a process of interpolation which ‘has no theoretical bound’ because
informal proofs are ‘infinitary objects’ (Rav, 1999, pp. 14–15).
§8. The considerations adduced thus far in favour of idealising concrete proof give
the strong formalist entitlement to assert that truth distributes over the connectives just as
proof does, and hence justify affirming LEM even in the case of concrete indeterminables–
but only for negation-complete fragments of language such as 0 arithmetic. What of the
rest? What of Gödelian incompleteness? Is our informal proof of the truth of each Gödel
sentence with respect to every true extension of Q not a case of an infinitary object as Rav
says, one which does not admit of reduction to a formal proof in a single system in which
theoremhood is recursively enumerable?
Here I agree with Rav in giving an affirmative answer, though not, perhaps, in a manner
which he would accept. For Rav explicitly assumes that formal proofs are finite. Why think
that? Why think that formal proof– derivability– must be recursively enumerable? What
reason is there to think that because the structure which justifies a theorem is infinitary the
proof cannot be formalised?
I hope it will be clear by now that the knee-jerk reaction which most philosophers
will give– proofs are epistemic constructions which have to convince finite creatures like
ourselves– is hopeless. To be sure, the concrete proofs which convince us are finite; not
just finite but actually quite small, much, much, smaller, in their number of symbols say,
than the estimated number of electrons in the observable universe. But we do not think this
means that our idealised notion of formal derivation should not permit strings longer than,
say 101000 in length. Idealisations must preserve the key feature, ‘recursiveness’, of our
informal practice, the feature which enables us to grasp new unencountered sentences and
proofs. But this is ‘recursiveness’ solely in the sense of grasp of iterable rules whose output
can in turn be fed in as input to the self-same rules. Nothing in that notion of recursiveness
rules out iteration into the transfinite.
Just as we have this small graspable token
1 (1) ¬{22001}: a=b Hyp.
1 (2) ¬{22001 - 2}: a=b 1 DNE
... ... ... 21000-2 steps of DNE
1 (21000 +1) a=b 21000 DNE.
20 One in which we choose to use ‘=’ rather than ‘≡ ’ for congruence modulo n.
INFORMAL PROOF, FORMAL PROOF, FORMALISM 19
of an unfeasibly long proof, (where ¬{n}P abbreviates P prefaced by n negation signs)
so too this
∅ (0) ¬Bew(0, G) Given.
. . . . . . . . .
∅ (n) ¬Bew(n, G) Given.
. . . . . . . . .
∅ (ω) ∀x(¬Bew(x, G) n ∈ ω; ω rule.
is a small, graspable token of an ω+1 long proof, using the ω rule, of a sentence G which is
a Gödel sentence with respect to a finitary partial idealisation of informal arithmetic, such
as Q plus standard first-order logic. Note that these tokens are not concrete realisations
of schematic proofs. Provided one accepts the infinitary mathematics involved in setting
up the notation, there is no more ambiguity in specifying which formal object the token
picks out than there is in knowing which term ‘S101000 ’ picks out in a formalisation of the
language LT (given that one grasps exponentiation).
Nor does the above requirement restrict us to countable infinitary logics, to Lω1ω1 . To
take a simple example, if we have a language with ℵ0 singular terms, a language closed
under conjunctions and disjunctions less than the first inaccessible > ℵ0 in size, then
∧(tα = tα) α < ℵ0
is a small token, abbreviating a rather long conjunction, a token which is perfectly compre-
hensible to anyone who understands enough transfinite arithmetic and the idea of indexing
singular terms by ordinals, and which again unambiguously specifies a formal correlate.21
Just as axiom sets and inference rules stated within a particular proof-architecture can
be ordered in terms of proof-theoretic strength, so too the formal frameworks themselves
can be ordered in terms of power. Polynomially-bounded logic is a weaker framework
than decidable logic (if P 	= NP), which is weaker than first-order predicate logic, and
so on through countable infinitary logics, accessible logics (which debar wffs and proofs
from being of inaccessible cardinal size) and beyond. A policy of accepting only minimal
idealisations of concrete practice, idealisations which allow for iteration of wff-forming
and proof-forming operators but are otherwise as close as possible to actual human capac-
ities, would surely drive us down to polynomially-bounded logic, if not below. This is a
price too high to pay, and once we see that there is no non-arbitrary cap to place on formal
frameworks in terms of cardinal size, we should let ℵα flowers bloom, for arbitrarily high α.
To be sure, moving beyond the weaker notions of proof opens up the possibility, noted
in the previous section, that two different formal systems F* and F** could equally well
idealise the notion of proof in F, yet come to different views as to whether  F S. The
formalist response to this should be the same as the response to the differences between
ordinary and modular arithmetic. The notion of formal proof or derivation differs between
the two systems so that  F S can be true* in the F* system and false** in F**:  F S
is ambiguous just as ‘3 = 0’ is. This may lead, then, to some ‘hyper-indeterminacies’
in that there is no unequivocal sense in which certain types of sentence– the Continuum
Hypothesis, the Axiom of Choice perhaps– are provable/true even as relativised to a par-
ticular infinitary formal system. But for an anti-platonist, this should not be a surprising or
disconcerting development.
21 For the formalist, of course, to say that there is a formal correlate for concrete token c is not to
say that THERE IS A FORMAL CORRELATE.
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Of course allowing idealisations of our concrete proof-theoretic practice to encom-
pass infinitary proof, as well as arbitrarily long finite proofs, will not in and of itself
ensure negation-completeness. Although the weak first-order theory Q is indeed negation-
complete, in the context of first-order logic augmented by the ω-rule, there are infinitary
systems of set theory in which e.g. the Continuum Hypothesis is undecided, as well as
some in which it is provable, others in which it is refutable. The formalist should say
(speaking from within a given meta-framework) that the standard formalisations of the
hypothesis mean somewhat different things in each formal framework (since it is the
frameworks of rules and axioms of proof which give meaning to the symbols of the system)
and that the different propositions expressed are respectively, i) not determinately true
nor false in the undecided case, ii) determinately true in the system in which it is prov-
able and iii) determinately false in the other. This is not counter-intuitive in the way that
denying truth value to sentences of arithmetic (and thus to sentences of the most basic
sorts of proof theory) is; on the contrary, it is perfectly consonant with an anti-platonist
perspective.
§9. Conclusion. I have addressed the question whether Rav is right to challenge
Hilbert’s Thesis that every ‘conceptual proof’ can be converted into a formal derivation and
if so what the implications are for formalism. My conclusion is that if one assumes formal
proofs are finitary objects, Rav’s scepticism about Hilbert Thesis I (and II) is justified.
That assumption, however, is itself unjustified. Any coherent philosophy of metamath-
ematics must allow a role for idealisation and a plausible conception of that role leads
to a liberalised notion of formal derivation. If we alter the ‘standard view of proof’, if
such it is, by dropping the finiteness requirement then the amended Hilbert Theses lose
their plausibility.22 Moreover on this conception of proof and the relationship between
informal and formal proof, the tight connection between truth and proof envisaged by the
formalist is not subject to the usual criticisms based on limitative theorems such as Gödel’s
incompleteness theorems.
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